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Stevens: 53rd Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture Series

THE 53RD HENRY J. MILLER DISTINGUISHED
LECTURE SERIES
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
APRIL 16, 2014

The Honorable John Paul Stevens (Ret.)
In June of 1979, at the end of my fourth term as a Justice of the
Supreme Court, I provided one of the five votes supporting the
majority’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, the case
holding that the Constitution does not require the police to obtain
a search warrant to authorize the installation of a pen register to
record the telephone numbers dialed from an individual suspect’s
home telephone. My vote in the case was influenced by my
experience as a naval officer during World War II. Today I plan to
say a few words about that work and then to discuss the question
whether the considerations supporting the holding in Smith apply
to today’s practice of creating, using, and preserving a database
including similar information about all of the telephone
conversations in the United States, including the millions that use
cell phones that did not even exist in 1979.
I
In the summer of 1941, Leon Smith, the Dean of Students at the
University of Chicago who was serving as a confidential recruiting
agent for the United States Navy, provided me with the opportunity
to earn a commission as an Ensign if I successfully completed the
Navy’s correspondence course in cryptography. One of the conditions
of accepting that opportunity was an oath that I would never divulge
either the existence of the course or the nature of my work for the
Navy. Since Congress later enacted legislation that allows me to
discuss that work today, I can tell you that I eventually received a
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letter inviting me to go to the Great Lakes Naval Station to take a
physical exam and formally apply for a commission. I did so on
December 6th, 1941 and the Japanese responded by attacking Pearl
Harbor the next morning.
While my correspondence course had provided me with training
in how to read the text of encoded and encrypted messages, when I
was on active duty I served as a traffic analyst, rather than as a
decoder or cryptographer. The job of the traffic analyst was to
obtain intelligence about enemy activities by monitoring his
communications without reading their text—what today is often
called “metadata” analysis. That skill is critically different from
actually reading intercepted messages. Knowledge about the volume
of the traffic in certain locations, identities of senders and
addressees, their choice of codes, and the length and timing of their
messages may enable the analyst to draw useful inferences; those
inferences, however, are far less reliable or informative than
intelligence gained by reading the texts of the messages
themselves.
A dramatic event that occurred in April of 1943 when I was on
duty as the traffic analysis watch officer in Pearl Harbor illustrates
the vast difference between the two intelligence techniques.
Intercepted traffic between the headquarters of the Japanese Navy’s
Commander-in-Chief in Tokyo and its Base Force No. 8 at Rabaul,
New Guinea, persuaded us that the enemy was developing a
response to its recent defeats on Guadalcanal. Our conjectures were
replaced by specific information after our cryptographers succeeded
in reading the text of one of those messages, which informed us not
only that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—the architect of the attack on
Pearl Harbor—would be making a morale-boosting tour of the area,
but also provided us with the exact details of his planned flight
from Rabaul to an airfield near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands.
With the express approval of President Roosevelt, American aviators
planned and executed an extremely difficult mission; they intercepted
the Japanese flight and shot down Yamamoto’s plane. I was on
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duty at the time and remember reading a dispatch reporting on the
downing of “one eagle” and a number of sparrows.
The difference between the quality of the intelligence obtained
through cryptanalysis and the inferences obtained through traffic
analysis is comparable to the difference between the intelligence
obtained by listening to an intercepted telephone conversation and
using a pen register to identify the parties to such a conversation.
From the point of view of the participants to the conversation, there
is a comparable difference in the magnitude of the invasion of
privacy resulting from disclosures of the external characteristics of
electronic messages and disclosures of their texts. The Japanese
assumed—incorrectly as it developed—that we would not be able to
read their encrypted messages, but they were certainly aware that we
were monitoring their radio communications. They knew that we
could, for example, use direction finders to pinpoint the location of
a submarine that broke radio silence while at sea.
Just as our enemies at war had a reasonable expectation that the
texts of their communications would not be available to third
parties, during peace potential criminals—like other citizens—
reasonably assume that third parties will not listen to their telephone
conversations. That expectation is protected by the requirement
that the police must obtain a warrant before eavesdropping on
such conversations. Those citizens are, however, well aware of the
fact that telephone companies record the external characteristics of
all of those conversations and that public agencies have access to
those records to enforce rules relating to their supervision of the
industry. When I first confronted the issue presented by the pen
record case in 1979, I was immediately reminded of the vast
difference between cryptanalysis and traffic analysis that was so
important during the war against Japan. It seemed appropriate to me
then—as it does now—to recognize the same distinction during our
ongoing war against crime.
The average citizen’s expectations of privacy necessarily change
in response to changes in society and changes in the law. The
invention of the automobile, for example, enhanced freedom by
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giving individuals the opportunity to engage in a multitude of new
enjoyable and profitable activities. But it also created new threats
of personal injury by careless drivers and misuse by potential
criminals. One of the public’s responses to those threats was the
requirement that every owner of a car obtain and display a license
plate identifying him whenever the car is driven on a public street.
That requirement facilitates the enforcement of traffic laws and the
apprehension of persons engaged in criminal activity. It also
impairs the value of the owner’s interest in preserving the privacy
of activities associated with the use of the car. Despite the license
requirement’s impact on privacy, it is now so familiar that few, if
any, persons question the conclusion that it is amply justified.
The fact that a new device—such as an automobile or a cell
phone—may generate routine activities or new rules that give the
public and the police access to information that a user of that device
would prefer not to disclose is not a sufficient justification for
imposing a warrant requirement as a pre-condition to police access
to that information. Rather, in my judgment, it is part of the price
that society pays for the benefits that the new device creates. The
ability to refuse to take advantage of an invention is always a
complete protection against the impairment of privacy that attends
the decision to use it. By maintaining radio silence, the Japanese
could have frustrated the work of our traffic analysts during World
War II.
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that even though
there is a vast difference between the quality of the intelligence
available through cryptanalysis and that derived from traffic
analysis, the latter also is significant. I mention two details to
support that conclusion. First, I was informed that the summary of
the Japanese radio traffic during the preceding 24 hours that I
prepared at the end of each of my watches was the first paper
that Admiral Edward Layton, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the
Pacific Fleet, read when he arrived in his office every morning.
Second, the pen register that the police installed on the telephone
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line of the defendant in Smith v. Maryland led to the apprehension
and conviction of a criminal who might otherwise have gone free.
In sum, I remain persuaded that the value of the benefits
obtained by the police as a result of their use of the pen register
to investigate suspicious activities far outweighed the value of
telephone users’ interest in avoiding disclosure of the identity of
the persons with whom they conversed on the phone. Mere
suspicion, which is the basis for every police investigation, does
not establish the probable cause required to obtain a search warrant.
A constitutional rule that required a showing of probable cause to
justify access to facts identifying the parties to telephone
conversations would impose a cost on the police that far outweighs
its benefits to the general public.
II
Newspaper accounts of the present government’s monitoring of
telephone communications describe a program that differs from the
use of the pen register in 1979 in both the magnitude of its potential
invasion of interests in privacy and in its value for protecting
public safety. Those differences have prompted debates about both
the wisdom of the program and its constitutionality. Whether they
support the conclusion that the program is unwise and should be
modified or abandoned is, of course, different from the possible
conclusion that the program is unconstitutional, and that the Smith
case should be overruled or distinguished.
The two most obvious differences point in different directions.
The cost of the program is immense. Despite the efficiency and
capacity of modern computers, the cost of maintaining and
monitoring the database likely involves large expenditures, and
almost cer tainly increases as the size of the program continues to
grow. Like searching for a needle in a field of haystacks, that cost
may well provide a sufficient justification for imposing significant
limits on the scope of the program. On the other hand, the program
is designed not to combat ordinary local criminal activity, but to
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prevent terrorist activity like the attack on the World Trade Center
in 2001. The possibility of such an attack is real and the possibility
that the program will lessen that danger is also real. Making
judgments about the relative importance of those possibilities is
obviously the business of our policy-makers rather than judges.
While neither the cost nor the potential value of the program
determines its constitutionality, other differences between the
program and the installation of a pen register may be relevant to the
constitutional issue. First, unlike the police examination of the use
of a single telephone for just a few days, the current programs involve
the possible permanent retention of a massive quantity of records.
The brief invasion of a single suspect’s expectation of privacy is
quite different from the on-going possibility that records in the
database may one-day reveal private information about any of the
millions of telephone users in the country. If measured by the number
of people whose expectation of privacy is potentially at risk, or by
the duration of that risk, the invasion seems unreasonable. But if it
is measured by the likelihood that any particular individual—or,
indeed, any group of innocent individuals—will be affected, the
possibility is infinitesimal, and certainly not unreasonable.
Instead of choosing between those two possible approaches to the
Fourth Amendment issue, it seems to me more helpful to focus on
the threat to privacy that is posed by any additions to the database,
or by government access to the database for the purpose of
investigating the use of a particular telephone. The reasoning that
the majority endorsed in the Smith case in 1979 placed a zero
value on the privacy interest because the identity of the persons called
on the defendant’s telephone—unlike what those persons said when
they used the phone—was routinely disclosed to the telephone
company (without any restrictions on its possible use) and therefore
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. That reasoning would also
apply to each new addition to the database. The fact that many
millions of additions to the database may be made on a daily basis
does not, it seems to me, make the impact on any one individual
any greater than the impact on the defendant in the Smith case.
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But even if the Fourth Amendment may not require the issuance
of a warrant before data is added to the database, perhaps it may
impose some sort of barrier to official use of information that has
already been accumulated. Such a judge-made rule might prohibit
access to the data without probable cause to believe a subscriber
is planning or engaging in unlawful activity. The effect of such a
rule, in my judgment, would be profoundly unwise because it would
render the database useless for the investigation of merely suspicious
activity.
There is a distinction of constitutional magnitude between
probable cause that is sufficient to support the issuance of a search
warrant and mere suspicion that is sufficient to motivate police
investigations but not sufficient to obtain a warrant. Using the
database to identify persons calling or receiving calls from a
telephone used by a suspected terrorist might help identify other
potential terrorists without shedding any light on on-going or
imminent criminal activity. Even if those possible identifications
might one day be valuable, that possibility would seldom, if ever,
rise to the level of probable cause. Restrictions on access to
information in the database would impair its usefulness, and the
introduction of a probable cause requirement might well frustrate
critical investigations of suspicious activity.
My appraisal of the value of the public interest in avoiding the
need to obtain a warrant to authorize either the continued addition
of new information to the database or the use of information
already included in the database returns me to the experience that
affected my vote in the Smith case in 1979 and prompts this
caveat.The inferences that a traffic analyst derives from the external
characteristics of radio transmissions qualify as suspicious
circumstances justifying further investigation, but seldom are
themselves a sufficient basis for concrete decisions. Those
inferences are far less reliable or useful than the facts that can be
obtained from the use of other intelligence techniques such as global
positioning systems that can track the precise movements and
location of vehicles. Because the data obtained from GPS sources
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is comparable to the text of intercepted messages, both in its
usefulness and its impact on privacy, and is unlike the inferences
obtained from pen registers or traffic analysis, what I have said
about the latter does not apply to the former.
In sum, I remain persuaded that the Smith case was correctly
decided in 1979 and that it supports the conclusion that the
preservation and use of records identifying the parties to telephone
conversations does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Whether the
database provides benefits that are justified by its cost is an issue
for others to debate.Historians may join forces with intelligence
experts in opposition to reporters concerned with protecting the
confidentiality of their sources during that debate, but it is a
subject on which I am not prepared to comment today.
Thank you for your attention.
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